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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
Judge Van Voorhis, dissenting, argued that Smith v. California served to
render Section 1141 unconstitutional. In view of the clear demonstration in
Shapiro of the legislature's intent to dispense with scienter, a construction
reading into the statute a requirement of scienter exceeded judicial power.
Despite the dissent, the decision does not shock. If there is a possible
construction which will uphold the statute, the Court should adopt it. The
earlier decisions in the Appellate Division afford good evidence that the
construction is not strained. Further, if the statute is clear on its face, the
court need not attempt to determine the intent of the legislature. Absent the
Shapiro decision, it is extremely unlikely that a legislative intent contrary to
the holding of the Supreme Court would have been considered. Certainly, if
the statute were stricken, it would have been reenacted as now interpreted.
The only objection open is the impact of the decision upon the defendants.
The disposition of the case does not, however, deny them their day in court
on the question of scienter. If they have objection, it is only upon the grounds
that they have been deprived of the benefit of a fortuitous gap in the law.
Bd.
DuE PROCESS AND POLICE POWER- CRIMINAL STATUTES
The enactment of a criminal statute must be a reasonable exercise of the
police power under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution. 0 For a court to uphold a statute making certain conduct criminal, it
must find some clear and reasonable connection between the statute and the
promotion of health, comfort, safety and welfare of society. 6
In People v. Bunis,6' the defendant was the owner of a bookstore in which
coverless magazines were sold. An information filed against the defendant in
the City Court of Buffalo charged him with a violation of Section 436-d of the
New York Penal Law.68 The City Court dismissed the information on the grounds
of stare decisis, noting that the supreme court,69 sitting in another county,
had held the same statute unconstitutional as an arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of the police power. An appeal from the dismissal was taken to the
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, 0 the State contending that this statute was a
lawful use of the police power in that its purpose was to prevent bookdealers,
such as the defendant, from tearing off the covers of magazines, returning the
65. While there is some indication that the scope of the police power under art. 1,
§ 6 of the New York Constitution is narrower than under the Fourteenth Amendment, it
is not now relevant to make a distinction; See Opinions of the Attorney General (1959) at
96.
66. Cf. Trio Distr. Corp. v. City of Albany, 2 N.Y.2d 690, 163 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1957);
Defiance Milk Products v. DuMond, 309 N.Y. 537, 132 N.E.2d 829 (1956); People v.
Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389, 17 N.E. 343 (1888).
67. 9 N.Y.2d 1, 210 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1961).
68. N.Y. Penal Law § 436-d:
Any person who knowingly sells . . . any magazine . . . from which the cover
or title page has been removed . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.
69. People ex rel Bunis v. Simmers, 13 Misc. 2d 1097, 181 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct.
1958).
70. 24 Misc. 2d 561, 205 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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covers for full credit to the publisher, and then reselling the magazines without
covers at a reduced price to the public.71 This legislative purpose, it was
contended, was proper because the statute protected not only the owners of the
returns but also the public from unscrupulous sellers of such merchandise who
did not have the legal title to it. The defendant contended that the purpose of
the statute was only to protect the publisher, and furthermore that it arbitrarily
and unreasonably prohibited lawful conduct.
The supreme court accepted the State's contention. The court indicated
that the statute was not so broad as to prohibit the lawful business of a second
hand bookdealer completely but only to prevent him from dealing in second
hand material where the cover page had been removed. The court rejected the
previous supreme court decision 72 on the grounds that the presiding judge in
that case incorrectly found that the purpose of the statute was to confer an
economic benefit on publishers, and therefore, it had no public purpose.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, a unanimous Court upheld the position
of the defendant. The statute, in forbiding "any" person from selling "any"
coverless magazine, thereby prohibited lawful conduct, the prohibition of which
had no connection with the public welfare. The Court held that the legislature
may not validly make criminal the doing of an act, which is innocent in itself,
merely because such act may be part of an illegal scheme. The statute must be
narrower in scope and directly attack the illegal scheme to defraud publishers.
It is apparent from reading the statute that it is overbroad, regardless of
whether the legislative intent in passing the statute was proper or not, and that
the Supreme Court made its error in this particular, as it did not construe a
penal statute with sufficient strictness.
73
This case then gives at least two possible reasons for holding a criminal
statute to be an abuse of the police power, and if read in connection with
People v. Munoz,74 decided by the Court of Appeals a week later, it indicates
the elastic meaning of the phrase, "reasonable connection between the statute
and the promotion of health, comfort, safety and welfare of society." These
two cases also illustrate the overlapping areas between the concepts of the
unreasonable use of the police power and the unconstitutionality of a statute
due to vagueness.
In the Munoz case the defendant, having had a pocket knife in his pocket,
was convicted in Magistrates' court of violating Section 436-5.2 of the New
York City Administrative Code.75 The defendant appealed to the Appellate
71. N.Y. State Legis. Annual (1956) at 25.
72. Supra note 69.
73. Cf. People v. Shifrin, 301 N.Y. 445, 94 N.E.2d 794 (1950). Accord, People v.
Estreich, 297 N.Y. 910, 79 N.E.2d 742 (1948).
74. 9 N.Y.2d 51, 211 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1961).
75. New York Admin. Code § 436-5.2:
(a) Legislative findings. It is hereby declared and found that the unlawful use
by persons under twenty-one years of age in public places of knives . . . is a
menace to the public health, peace, safety and welfare. ...
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Part of the Court of Special Sessions,1 6 contending primarily that the statute
was unconstitutionally vague and an arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the
police power. The Court of Special Sessions affirmed the defendant's conviction,
holding that subdivision (b), read with the exceptions enumerated in sub-
division (c), is clearly understandable when the language is given its ordinary
and usual meaning. The court disposed of the police power issue by indicating
generally that there was a reasonable relation between the statute and the
public welfare. The court also held that every presumption is in favor of
constitutionality in construing a statute.
77
On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction upon
the grounds that the statute was too vague in that it did not define what articles
were specifically prohibited, nor did it distinguish between sexes. According to
the Court, it was uncertain whether a minor female who was carrying a knitting
needle would fall within the statute. The Court held that carrying a penknife
was not connected with any moral guilt standing alone; therefore, a person in
possession of such an instrument would not have knowledge of this moral wrong
without being told. Under such circumstances, it would be imperative for the
statute to be specific in outlining the acts rendered criminal.
The State contended that since the statute excludes instances where the
instrument is carried under circumstances that tend to establish lawfulness, not
however to include amusement or self defense, it is sufficiently specific. The
Court, in rejecting this contention, said that the language only rendered the
statute more vague, since when analyzed it prohibits what is lawful only if it is
unlawful; that the statute implied that the defendant is to be exonerated if he
can prove no criminal intent, notwithstanding that no criminal intent is required
for the offense.
On the police power issue, the Court held that although a statute may
render conduct criminal without requiring a specific or general intent, there must
be some reasonable relationship between public safety, health, morals or welfare
and the act prohibited, and that no such reasonable relationship existed here.
This holding was apparently premised on the argument that if this statute
were specifically to require criminal intent it would be constitutional. However,
such intent cannot be presumed from the possession of innocent articles alone.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person under the age of twenty-one years to
carry . . . in any public place . . . any . . . knife or sharp pointed or edged
instrument which may be used for cutting or puncturing.
(c) Such person shall not be in violation . .. if his possession is necessary for
his employment . . . or if such possession is for use while he is engaged in or
returning from a place of hunting . . . and wherever required, is also carrying
a currently valid license . . . or if such person is a duly enrolled member of the
Boy Scouts of America . . . and such possession is necessary to participate in the
activities of such organization . . . or if the said knife or instrument is carried
under circumstances that tend to establish that its possession is for a lawful
purpose, not however to include self-defense or amusement.
76. 22 Misc. 2d 1078, 200 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1960).
77. Cf. Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 255, 203 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1960); Wiggins v.
Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 173 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1958).
113
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Legislative presumptions to be valid must have enough basis in human
experience so that the presumption has some fair relationship or natural
connection with the fact on which it rests.
78
Chief Judge Desmond and Judge Dye dissented on the ground that this
statute does not go as far as statutes which make criminal the selling or
possession of an imitation pistol,79 or the sale of fireworks,
80 and that the
legislative purpose premising the statute was valid in that it was to prevent
gang wars and the like. On the vagueness issue, the dissenting Judges followed
the reasoning of the lower court in saying that the statute, although general in
coverage, was specific in its exceptions, so that there could be no question as
to what instruments were prohibited, or who was prohibited from carrying
them.
It would seem that the Court of Appeals was in error in part in declaring
this statute void for vagueness, and that the dissenting Judges were correct.
The language, if read in its ordinary meaning, obviously includes anyone under
twenty-one and any sharp pointed instrument. The vaguest exception to the
general coverage is where a minor can exonerate himself if circumstances tend
to show lawful purposes, except for amusement or self defense. But it would
seem that the language of the statute is sufficiently certain in the constitutional
sense, since it gives a person a reasonably certain standard of conduct to follow.81
However, this last provision, together with the law on statutory presumptions,
can be looked upon as making the statute arbitrary and unreasonable, as was
also indicated in the Court's opinion. It will also be noted that this statute
could be held unconstitutional on the pure holding of the Bunis case. A blanket
prohibition of the carrying of a knife, even when used for amusement purposes,
is arbitrary and unreasonable, irrespective of the effect of statutory pre-
sumptions.
The Court in People v. Merolla,82 also decided this term, passed upon
issues similar to those in the Munoz case. In the Merolla case, the relevant
statute was Section 7 of the Waterfront Commission Act.83 The defendant was
convicted under this statute in the Court of Special Sessions, after he was
observed by investigators in a pier loading area making contacts with long-
shoremen. Nine of the twelve men so contacted gave him money. Upon being
questioned, the defendant stated that he was selling shoes, but he could not
give specific names of purchasers, nor could this story be verified at the trial.
78. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463
(1943).
79. New York City Admin. Code § 435-5.0(g).
80. N.Y. Penal Law § 1894-a.
81. Cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Boyce Motor Lines. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
82. 9 N.Y.2d 62, 211 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1961).
83. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 9932 (McKinney 1961):
No person shall without satisfactory explanation, loiter upon any . . . waterfront
facility or within 500 feet thereof....
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The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division8 4 which affirmed the con-
viction without opinion.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the defendant contended that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague, specifically in the phrases "loiter,"
"without a satisfactory explanation" and "within 500 feet."
The Court held that although the term "loiter" is one of common and
accepted meaning,8 5 it is not enough standing by itself to indicate the prohibited
conduct, unless in any given statute its scope is narrowed to refer to a
restricted public area.86 In this case the Court construed "loiter" to mean
lingering about waterfront facilities for a purpose unconnected with lawful
waterfront business or related activity. The Court also held that the phrase
"without satisfactory explanation" did not render the statute vague but in
fact served to restrict the scope of the statute to the advantage of the defendant
by imposing a procedural condition rather than adding a substantive element
to the offense.87 The Court refused to consider the constitutionality of the third
phrase, "within 500 feet." Considering the actual length of the pier and water-
front area, the defendant alleged that such a distance would of necessity
encompass the public streets, and that such a statute would clearly fall under
the rule of People v. Diaz.88 Since the defendant was arrested within the
waterfront area and not in the streets, the Court refused to pass on a
constitutional issue prematurely. 9
Although in Merolla, the Court was passing on specific word content as
opposed to general vagueness, it would seem that the phrase "without satis-
factory explanation" is closely akin to the phrase "carried under circumstances
that tend to establish that its possession is for a lawful purpose," which was
held to be unconstitutionally vague in Munoz.
Here again is the added factor that carrying a penknife is in itself not
unlawful; whereas, loitering in a waterfront area, especially under the specific
construction given to this language by the Court, is a type of offense which is
an evil and considered a criminal offense in itself. A second factor is the form
of the words. The words "without a satisfactory explanation" give the defendant
a procedural release; whereas, the words in the Munoz statute are stricter in
that circumstances affirmatively must show lawful purposes. It is easier to
84. 11 A.D.2d 799, 205 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1960).
85. Accord, People v. Johnson, 6 N.Y.2d 549, 190 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1959); People v.
Bell, 306 N.Y. 110, 115 NXE.2d 821 (1953).
86. In People v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469, 176 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1958), the Court of Appeals
held invalid a statute prohibiting loitering in public streets; In People v. Jonhson, supra
note 85, a statute prohibiting loitering about public schools was upheld; In People v. Bell,
supra note 85, a statute prohibiting loitering about railroad stations and subways was
upheld. For a good discussion of the interrelationship of the Diaz, Johnson and Bell
cases, see 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 95 (1959).
87. People v. Bell, supra note 85.
88. Supra note 86.
89. People v. Faxlanger, 1 N.Y.2d 393, 153 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1956).
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explain a person's presence on a waterfront facility than to show extrinsic
circumstances tending to prove lawful possession of a penknife.
It is apparent from this discussion that in some instances the courts may
be able to apply the rules as to vagueness, overbroadness and abuse of the
police power to the same set of facts. The courts may also apply some of the
rules to the exclusion of the others where all of them could apply. In most cases
the tendency is to attack the most obvious defect in the statute, rather than
discuss all the possible reasons for invalidity. Of course, in some of these cases
there will be no unanimous agreement as to what the paramount defect is.
M. A. L.
CONTRACTS
NEW PROMISE MADE UPON PAST CONSIDERATION NOT ENFORCEABLE
In Arden v. Freydberg,l an insurance agent, at the request of defendants,
devised and submitted a plan for corporate life insurance policies to defendants'
corporation. Subsequent to the submission of the plan defendants orally
promised plaintiff that the policies would be written by him. The plan as
prepared by plaintiff was adopted by defendants' corporation, but the insurance
was written through an employee of the corporation who was made an insurance
agent for that sole purpose. Plaintiff brought an action for damages in an
amount equal to the commissions and renewal commissions he would have
received, if defendants had placed the plan with him.
The trial court's judgment for the plaintiff was reversed by the Appellate
Division.2 The Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 decision affirming the Appellate
Division, stated that the oral promises made by the defendants subsequent to
submission of the plan by plaintiff did not afford adequate consideration to
create an enforceable contract. Consideration which consists of services already
performed is generally held to be insufficient to support a promise.,,
The majority found that at the time the request was made by defendants,
there was no accompanying promise, express or implied, to obtain the insurance
from the plaintiff. Therefore, in the opinion of the majority, if a contract was
created, one could be found only on the defendants' subsequent promises, which
were not binding because they were supported by past consideration.
The dissent took the view that the conduct of the parties from the initial
request to the final acceptance disclosed the creation of a unilateral contract.4
At the time the request for the submission of the plans was made, a promise to
place the insurance with plaintiff could be implied. The performance by
1. 9 N.Y.2d 393, 214 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1961).
2. 11 A.D.2d 1, 201 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1961).
3. Axelrod v. 77 Park Ave. Corp., 225 App. Div. 557, 234 N.Y. Supp. 27 (1st Dep't
1929); Blanshan v. Russell, 32 App. Div. 103, 52 N.Y. Supp. 963 (3d Dep't 1898), aft'd, 161
N.Y. 629, 55 N.E. 1093 (1899).
4. On unilateral contract, see 33 Colum. L. Rev. 463 (1933).
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